

DIRECTORATE OF  
OPERATIONSDOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION  
Intelligence Information Report

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COUNTRY USSR

DCD REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT Meeting of the US-USSR Working Group on Science Policy/Poor Quality of Soviet Answers/Soviet Dissatisfaction with US Answers/Vague Position of USSR State Committee for Science and Technology/Georgian State Committee for Science and Technology

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1. The US delegation of the US/USSR Working Group on Science Policy recently visited the USSR. It was difficult to discern exactly what Soviet expectations from this program were. The Soviets seem to have a different level of commitment than the US side. At times the Soviets give the impression that they are not even certain themselves what they expect from the exchange. For example, in an attempt to give some structure to the general exchange and provide checks on the activities as they develop, the US side presented an agenda of items which proposed end papers and case studies. The Soviets agreed to the program but their studies will not be done until 1976, and the US side will not be able to monitor the quality of either the research or the data.
2. Prior to this meeting, the US and Soviet sides exchanged a list of questions with the agreement that there would be at least a five-page answer to each question. Sixteen of the Soviet answers consisted of one page or less. They were drawn up by / fnu / Lychenko [phonetic] who is from the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology. It appears as though the answers were not done by the members of the USSR delegation but by lower-level subordinates within the S&T Committee's bureaucracy who probably were not aware of the open literature on the topics covered. In formulating their answers, it does not appear that the S&T Committee representatives drew on the expertise or advice of other Soviet institutions.
3. Members of the US delegation privately expressed their dissatisfaction with the poor quality of the Soviet answers to their Soviet colleagues. They also expressed the doubt that the Soviets were seriously interested in the exchange. Dr. Ivan Dmitriyevich Ivanov, Institute of the USA and Canada, reacted to this criticism by inviting one of the US delegates to write a formal complaint. When he was told that the US side wanted to avoid harping about Soviet deficiencies in this respect, Ivanov said that the US answers did not meet Soviet expectations either. Ivanov also mentioned that the Soviets could not believe that the US does not have a list of national priority projects. The Soviets know that the US annually budgets enormous sums of money, but

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they presume these funds are allocated to a series of projects in a descending order of priorities. The idea that separate agencies line up their own programs or that personnel involved in precision technologies form aggregate or separate special programs rather than one kind of optimal program is foreign to the Soviet mentality. Ivanov also accused the US side of nitpicking over the language used in the joint protocol issued at the end of the meeting. To the Soviets, the US side gave the impression of not being serious about the trip and interested only in getting a formal document to take home to justify the expense of the trip to their superiors.

4. During the meetings the Soviets maintained their official pose and avoided relating to their US counterparts on a personal level. Soviet perceptions of the US side differed among individual Soviets depending on his background. Ivanov seems to have status as some kind of specialist on the US although he is not an expert on US science. He has an economic background and spent about five years at the UN. He was even a "China watcher" for a while. Oleg Ivanovich Larishev, an expert on management decision-making from the Institute of Control Problems is another US affairs specialist on the Soviet delegation.
5. The Soviets were hesitant to reveal the degree of authority which the USSR State Committee on S&T has, or its exact relationship to other Soviet institutions. When asked to define the Committee's relationship to the Central Committee the Soviets declined comment. Therefore, the degree of authority which the State Committee on S&T wields is questionable. The Committee has conflicts with the ministries on one side and with the Academy of Sciences on the other. Although the Committee perceives the ministries and academic institutes as adversaries in some respects, it also works very closely with them.
6. In the midst of their visit, the US delegates were hustled off to Tbilisi, Georgia, with the vague impression that the Soviets wanted to get them off their hands for a few days. While in Georgia they visited a champagne factory and met with representatives of the Georgian State Committee for Science and Technology which is the only state committee for S&T on the republic level in the USSR. It has no formal links with the USSR State Committee for S&T in Moscow. The Soviets are presently toying with the idea of forming other state committees of S&T on the republic level.

[ Headquarters Comment: CRS records show a reference to an Ivan Lyashenko at the State Committee for Science & Technology. ]

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